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Abstract 
Determination of inspection and maintenance policies for minimizing long-term risks and costs in deteriorating engineering environments constitutes 
a complex optimization problem. Major computational challenges include the (i) curse of dimensionality, due to exponential scaling of state/action set 
cardinalities with the number of components; (ii) curse of history, related to exponentially growing decision-trees with the number of decision-steps; 
(iii) presence of state uncertainties, induced by inherent environment stochasticity and variability of inspection/monitoring measurements; (iv) presence 
of constraints, pertaining to stochastic long-term limitations, due to resource scarcity and other infeasible/undesirable system responses.  In this work, 
these challenges are addressed within a joint framework of constrained Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) and multi-agent 
Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). POMDPs optimally tackle (ii)-(iii), combining stochastic dynamic programming with Bayesian inference 
principles.  Multi-agent DRL addresses (i), through deep function parametrizations and decentralized control assumptions. Challenge (iv) is herein 
handled through proper state augmentation and Lagrangian relaxation, with emphasis on life-cycle risk-based constraints and budget limitations. The 
underlying algorithmic steps are provided, and the proposed framework is found to outperform well-established policy baselines and facilitate adept 
prescription of inspection and intervention actions, in cases where decisions must be made in the most resource- and risk-aware manner. 
Keywords: Inspection and maintenance planning; system risk and reliability; constrained stochastic optimization; partially observable Markov decision 
processes; deep reinforcement learning; decentralized multi-agent control  
1.  Introduction 
Optimal inspection and maintenance planning delineates a class of 
important engineering decision-making problems, aimed at 
supporting sustainable and resilient operation of systems and 
networks over their life-cycle. Optimality refers to minimizing 
various societal, environmental, and economic risks, along with other 
operational costs, as these emerge due to the combined consequences 
of the selected actions of the decision-maker and their effects on the 
future exogenous deterioration of the environment. Within this 
context, the goal of the decision-maker is to determine an appropriate 
policy, i.e. an optimal rule of sequential decisions over a presumed 
time frame, which is able to aptly map states and times to intervention 
and observation actions [1, 2].  
Literature indicates several approaches to solving this problem, 
from threshold-based nonlinear and mixed-integer programming 
formulations (e.g. in [3, 4, 5, 6]), to analysis of decision trees (e.g. in 
[7, 8, 9, 10]), and from renewal theory (e.g. in [11, 12, 13, 14]), to 
stochastic optimal control (e.g. in [15, 16, 17, 18]). These approaches 
are also applicable to infrastructure problems beyond inspection and 
maintenance planning, such as post-disaster recovery, e.g. in [19, 20, 
21]. Respectively, admissible solution strategies to the above 
approaches span from exhaustive policy enumeration, and genetic 
algorithms, to gradient-based schemes, and dynamic programming. 
Besides formulations that leverage dynamic programming and 
stochastic optimal control concepts, a common characteristic 
underlying traditional inspection and maintenance planning methods 
is that the decision-making problem, despite its inherent sequential 
and dynamic nature, is articulated by means of static optimization 
formulations. As a result, many otherwise practical approaches tend 
to be more susceptible to optimality limitations, especially in 
problems with high-dimensional spaces and long decision horizons, 
challenges also known as the curse of dimensionality and curse of 
history, respectively [22, 23]. Moreover, many solution techniques 
often lack cohesive and generalizable mathematical capabilities 
regarding the consistent integration of stochastic environments 
and/or uncertain observation outcomes in the optimization process, 
as well as the incorporation of stochastic or deterministic constraints 
that need to be satisfied over multiple time steps or even the entire 
operating life of the system.   
To address the above issues, this work follows a stochastic optimal 
control approach, casting the optimization problem within the joint 
context of constrained Partially Observable Markov Decision 
Processes (POMDPs) and multi-agent Deep Reinforcement Learning 
(DRL). POMDPs are able to alleviate the curse of history as a result 
of their dynamic programming principles, and to facilitate optimal 
reasoning in the presence of real-time noisy observations [24]. Their 
efficiency in inspection and maintenance planning has been 
thoroughly studied and exemplified in [25, 26, 27, 28], among others.  
Within the same class of applications, in the confluence of DRL and 
point-based POMDPs, the Deep Centralized Multi-agent Actor Critic 
(DCMAC) approach has been recently developed in [29, 30], an off-
policy algorithm with experience replay, belonging in the general 
family of actor-critic approaches [31, 32]. DCMAC leverages the 
concept of belief-state MDPs, a fundamental idea for the 
development of point-based POMDP algorithms, thus directly 
operating on the posterior probabilities of system states given past 
actions and observations [33]. In DCMAC, individual control units 
are centralized in terms of global state information and sharing of 
policy network parameters, nonetheless, they are decentralized in 
terms of policy outputs. Hence, based on classic Markov decision 
processes  formalism, DCMAC provides Decentralized POMDP 
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(Dec-POMDP) solutions [34, 35], for a setting where the agents 
representing the various control units have access to the entire state 
distribution of the system, however, having the autonomy to make 
their own choices without being aware of each other’s actions. DRL 
is extremely efficient in tackling the curse of dimensionality 
stemming from high-dimensional and/or combinatoric state spaces, 
whereas the computational hurdle of exponential scaling of the 
number of actions with the number of components, is seamlessly 
handled by the decentralized multi-agent formulation of the problem, 
given that decentralization enables linear scaling. 
Building upon the above described DRL concepts in this work, a 
modified architecture compared to the original DCMAC approach is 
implemented for the actor. We consider a sparser parametrization of 
the actor, without parameter sharing, i.e. each agent has its own 
individual policy network. We call this architecture Deep 
Decentralized Multi-agent Actor Critic (DDMAC). Similar 
approaches exist for various cooperative/competitive multi-agent 
robotic and gaming control tasks [36, 37].  Thorough reviews on 
state-of-the-art methods and applications can be also found in [38, 
39]. Despite the architectural differences with DCMAC, DDMAC 
solves the same Dec-POMDP problem, eliminating, however, inter-
agent interactions in the hidden layers for the sake of computational 
efficacy. Based on this numerical approach, this paper is particularly 
focused on investigating the effects of incorporating resource 
constraints and other limitations, especially in the forms of budget 
and life-cycle risk constraints. Depending on the nature of the 
modeled limitations, the constraints can be addressed through either 
state augmentation or primal-dual optimization approaches based on 
the Lagrangian function of the problem.   
Constrained static optimization formulations for operation and 
maintenance policies exist in the literature, e.g. in [3, 14, 40, 41], 
mainly reflecting short-term risk, reliability-based, and budget-
related considerations. In the case of POMDPs, the optimization 
problem now falls in the category of constrained POMDPs. 
Constrained Markov decision processes have been given model-
based solutions with the aid of linear programming formulations in 
[42, 43]. Exact POMDP alpha-vector value interation can be 
extended to constrained problems as well, inheriting, however, the 
PSPACE complexity of the unconstrained solution [44]. 
Unconstrained point-based POMDPs algorithms, which are well-
suited for inspection and maintenance planning of systems with up to 
thousands of states and hundreds of actions and observations [27, 18], 
have also been extended to constrained problems [45]. In multi-
component systems, under the assumption of component-wise 
independent cost functions, states, and actions, [46] derives 
constrained POMDP solutions through a series of unconstrained 
solutions controlled by a linear master program. Overall, and 
notwithstanding their principled mathematical descriptions, the 
above value iteration and linear or nonlinear programming 
formulations are fundamentally hard to extend to high-dimensional 
systems that are of interest in this work.  
In DRL, constraints typically refer to either the parameters of the 
approximated functions, or the cumulative returns related to auxiliary 
functions of interest [47, 48, 49]. The former methods restrain the 
iterate increment of the policy parameter updates to be within a trust 
region of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the new and the 
old policy, thus preventing abrupt policy changes and, consequently, 
training instabilities. In such cases, optimization is typically based on 
surrogates of the objective and constraint functions [47]. The latter 
methods typically aim to protect the agent from unsafe or otherwise 
undesirable states and choices during training or policy deployment. 
To this end, the objective is optimized with the aid of primal-dual 
formulations, either through trust region concepts, or Lagrangian 
relaxation, or domain-based manual penalization [48, 50, 51]. Safe 
RL formulations similarly integrate risk and policy variance in the 
constraint functions of the problem, or directly intervene in 
exploration to guide training [52, 53]. Such “safety” constraints can 
for example pertain to the probability of failure over multiple steps 
and, as such, they reflect soft constraints, meaning that they only need 
to be satisfied in a probabilistic or expected sense. The satisfaction of 
hard constraints, such as budget constraints, are easier to account for 
in the optimization process through state augmentation. Such 
constraints tend to be relevant for other resource limitations as well, 
e.g. in cases of limited availability of operating crews, inspectors, etc. 
In this work, we consider and study both types of constraints. 
In summarizing, in this paper we consider and optimize DRL-
driven non-periodic inspection and maintenance policies in the 
presence of resource limitations and risk-related constraints. First, the 
preliminaries of the POMDP formulation in inspection and 
maintenance planning are elaborated, with insights in the problem-
specific modeling requirements. State updating equations and 
inspection, maintenance, shutdown, and risk cost definitions are 
presented. It is studied and discussed how the selected actions affect 
the above costs, and which the inherent mechanisms that drive 
observational strategies in POMDPs are. Theoretical analysis 
pertaining to perpetual and instantaneous risk definitions is 
presented, along with their relation to classical definitions. The 
optimization problem is cast within the context of decentralized 
multi-agent DRL control, where agents operate directly on the belief 
space, i.e. the space of posterior system statistics based on past 
actions and observations. The developed and employed DRL 
approach, DDMAC, is an off-policy actor-critic method with 
experience replay, modifying the original architecture presented in 
[29]. The relevant algorithmic steps for implementing the above 
described decentralized DRL framework are provided, based on state 
augmentation for hard constraints and Lagrangian relaxation for soft 
constraints. Quantitative investigation is conducted based on a 
stochastically deteriorating multi-component system. Numerical 
experiments include evaluation of different baseline policies, and 
different budget and risk constraint scenarios. The resulting evolution 
of various system metrics pertaining to risk, reliability, inspection, 
and intervention choices over the system operating life is 
parametrically studied and discussed based on the learned policies.  
2.  POMDPs in inspection and maintenance planning 
2.1. The optimization problem  
The goal of the decision-maker (agent) in a life-cycle inspection and 
maintenance optimization problem is to determine an optimal policy 
π = π* that minimizes the total cumulative future operational costs 
and risks in expectation: 
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Fig. 1. POMDP diagram in time, including intermediate states occurring after 
actions and before environment transitions. 
 
where ct = c(st,at,st+1) is the cost incurred at time t by taking action at 
ϵ A, and transitioning from state st ϵ S to state st+1 ϵ S; ot  ϵ  Ω is an 
observation outcome; γ ϵ [0,1] is the discount factor translating future 
costs to current value; b0 is an initial distribution over states (or initial 
belief); Vπ is the value function, which expresses the total discounted 
cost given a state or a belief under policy π; and T is the length of the 
planning horizon. Planning horizon T can be either finite or infinite. 
A finite horizon problem can be solved as an infinite one, through 
proper formulation of the problem, i.e. through augmenting the state 
space with time, and considering an absorbing state at the final time 
step [54].  
Policy π is a rule according to which actions are taken by the 
decision-maker at different time steps, and it can be, at best, a map 
from histories of actions and observations to actions, π: At-1× Ω t →A. 
The policy function belongs to a space, π ϵ Πc, which contains all 
possible policies that are admissible under the existing constraints of 
the problem. Πc is a subset of Π, which is the policy space of the 
unconstrained problem. From the mapping a policy function 
conducts, it can be observed that the number of possible policies can 
easily become immense, even in problems with small planning 
horizons. Also known as the curse of history, this problem is 
optimally tackled by dynamic programming and POMDPs as 
explained in detail in the next section. Another approach to attack this 
complexity, however, often at the expense of solution efficiency, is 
to exploit problem-specific characteristics and employ simplified 
assumptions, including approaches that impose action periodicity, 
policy uniformity among components, component prioritization, 
ranking, or clustering [12, 55, 56, 57, 58]. Particularly in inspection 
planning, periodic inspection visits or non-periodic inspections that 
exploit similarity and/or prioritization of components is typical for 
deteriorating structural systems [10, 57].  
Policy π can also be stochastic, in which case it is a mapping to a 
probability distribution over actions, i.e. π: At-1× Ω t →P(A). It can be 
shown under loose regularity conditions about the cost function that 
the optimal policy in a Markov decision process is deterministic [59]. 
However, in general and especially in the presence of constraints, the 
optimal policy is more broadly described by functions accounting for 
stochastic mappings [42]. 
 
2.2. Mapping posterior state distributions to actions 
In a POMDP environment, transition from state st =s to state st+1 =s' 
is Markovian. Detaching the effect of the maintenance action from 
the environment transition (natural deterioration), we can define an 
intermediate state, sta =sa ϵ S. This state succeeds s, with probability 
Pr(sa|s,a), and reflects the system state immediately after 
maintenance and before the environment transition. This distinction 
is important to help us better define and quantify the risk in the next 
section. State s' succeeds sa with probability Pr(s'|sa,a), after the 
environment transition, i.e. s' = sa,e. Owing to the Markovian property, 
given a pair (s,a), the probability distribution of s' can be fully 
defined, regardless of the prior history of actions and states as: 
 Pr ' | , Pr( ' | , )Pr( | , )
a
a a
s S
s s a s s a s s a

    (2) 
Similarly, the cost at a certain time step can be expressed as: 
     , , ' Pr | , , , , '
a
a a
s S
c s a s s s a c s a s s

    (3) 
State augmentation can be applied if higher order temporal 
dependencies exist regarding the history of states and/or actions prior 
to t, or the environment is characterized by non-stationarity [54, 25]. 
In POMDPs, at each time step, states are hidden to the agent, and are 
only perceivable through the noisy observation ot=o ϵ  Ω. Observation 
o depends on the state of the system and the respective action at the 
current step, and is defined by probability Pr(o| s, a). The entire 
process described above is depicted in the network of Fig. 1. 
As a result of the structure of POMDPs, optimal policy π* can be 
defined, without any loss of information, as a function of belief bt=b 
ϵ B: S→P(S), which is a sufficient statistic of the entire history of 
previous actions and observations, up to time t. Belief b is thus the 
posterior probability distribution over states, given the previous 
belief, and the current transition, action and observation. Hence, the 
belief at time t+1, bt+1=b'=ba,e,o, is easily computed though Bayesian 
updating as: 
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b
  (4) 
where probabilities b(s), for all s ϵ S, form the |S|-dimensional belief 
vector b. The denominator of Eq. (4), Pr(o'|b,a), is the standard 
normalizing constant: 
       
'
Pr ' | , Pr ' | ', Pr ' | ,
a
a a a
s S s S
o a o s a s s a b s
 
 b   (5) 
Similarly to sa, belief ba in Eqs. (4) and (5) is the intermediate belief, 
right after the maintenance action and before the environment 
transition and observation, defined as: 
     Pr | ,a a a
s S
b s s s a b s

   (6) 
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In the special case that the environment is fully observable, i.e. o= 
s, observation specifies exactly which one of the belief vector entries 
is 1, assigning 0 otherwise. This defines an MDP environment and, 
accordingly, Pr(o'|b,a) reduces to Pr(s'|b,a), which is the transition 
probability of MDPs given the current state distribution. Following 
this remark, it is apparent that Pr(o'|b,a) holds transition probability 
semantics for the belief space, B, hence a POMDP can be seen as a 
belief-MDP, where now, however, states are the belief vectors. 
Accordingly, the transition between beliefs is given as: 
   '
'
Pr ' | , Pr ' | ,
o
a o a

   b xb x b b   (7) 
where δij is the Kronecker delta, i.e. δij=1 if i=j, 0 otherwise.  
This allows us to write the optimality equation, also known as the 
Bellman equation [22], in the belief space as: 
   
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 
 b b   (8) 
where V(b)=Vπ*(b) is the optimal value function, representing the 
total life-cycle cost under the optimal policy π* given an initial belief 
b, H is the Bellman backup operator, Q is the optimal action-value 
function, and cb is the expected cost at belief b, defined as: 
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Operator H is a contraction with unique fixed point V(b). It has been 
shown that the POMDP cost value function described by the Bellman 
equation in Eq. (8) is piece-wise linear and concave (convex for the 
maximization problem) at every time step, composed of linear 
hyperplanes, also called the alpha-vectors [60]. Each alpha-vector 
corresponds to an inspection and maintenance action [26, 61]. 
Despite its analogies with MDPs, Eq. (8) is hard to solve exactly 
through standard MDP-based approaches, e.g. through value or 
policy iteration. However, there are numerous efficient approximate 
solution procedures along the lines of point-based algorithms [33]. 
Point-based algorithms sample a subset of the reachable belief space, 
starting from an initial root belief, thus making value iteration scale 
linearly with the cardinality of this subset. DRL is used for solving 
Eq. (8) in this work, using the point-based belief MDP concept 
combined with deep function approximations and actor-critic 
training [29].  
2.3. Risks and costs 
Cost at different time steps for a selected action can be decomposed 
into inspection cost, cI, maintenance cost, cM, and damage state cost, 
cD. In addition, it is often important for the decision-maker to account 
for the possibility of additional losses due to intentional system 
shutdowns, cS, which may occur not as a consequence of damage, but 
rather as a result of the selected actions. Accounting for this as well, 
the total cost at each decision step can be generally expressed as: 
         
maintenan. cost shutdown cost inspection cost damage state cost
, , , , , ', , 'a aM S I Dc s a s s c s a c s a c s a c s s      (10) 
Using Eq. (10) in Eq. (9), the expected inspection, maintenance 
and shutdown costs, can be written as: 
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Although Eq. (11) provides a broad description of the cost function, 
it is often appropriate to adopt the hypothesis that inspection and 
maintenance actions affect the respective costs independently, and 
are also independent of the system state (this hypothesis is stronger 
for inspections since certain maintenance actions may depend on the 
extent of damage in the system): 
     
     
,
,
',
,
I b I I I
M b M M M
c s a c a c a
c s a c a c a
 
 
  (12) 
where aI ϵ AI is the selected inspection action and aM ϵ AM  is the 
selected maintenance action. Under this distinctive consideration of 
actions, the total action can be defined as a ϵ A=AI×AM. We will refer 
here to no inspection and no maintenance actions as trivial inspection 
and trivial maintenance actions respectively. Trivial actions may also 
refer to routine maintenance and inspection actions, which are actions 
that are always taken at every time step, thus their costs do not affect 
the optimization process. Similarly to Eq. (12), it is also reasonable 
to assume in many problems of inspection and maintenance planning 
that scheduled shutdowns will be primarily triggered by maintenance 
actions only, namely: 
   , ,S S Mc s a c s a   (13)  
Damage state cost cD translates various losses associated with the 
damage states of the system to cost units. These can be devised into 
two types of losses, which we will refer to as instantaneous losses 
and perpetual losses. Instantaneous losses refer to costs incurred 
upon arrival at a damage state and do not continue to be collected for 
as long as the system sojourns this damage state. In the case of a 
failed civil engineering structure, for instance, such costs can be 
related to capital-related losses, which occur at the time step at which 
the structural system transitions to the failure state. This cost is 
collected once over the operating life, unless the system is restored 
and fails again. Perpetual losses, on the other hand, refer to costs 
collected for as long as the system sojourns a certain damage state, 
regardless of which damage state it transitioned from. In the 
previously mentioned example of a failed civil engineering structure, 
such costs can be related to economic losses due to downtime, which 
are, of course, not instantaneous but accrue over time, until the 
system is restored to an operating status. Following this distinction, 
the damage cost component of Eq. (10) is written as: 
     ', ' ' 'a
a per inst
D D Ds s
c s s c s d c s    (14) 
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where [dij]i,j ϵ S is the adjacency matrix pertaining to damage states, as 
this can be derived by state connectivity according to available 
actions. That is, if there is an action such that state j is an immediate 
successor of i, then dij=1. For i=j, dij=0. In deteriorating 
environments, it commonly happens that states are ordered, that is, 
transitions from sa to s' form an upper-triangular transition matrix, 
meaning that the system can only transition to a worse state, or at best 
remain at the same one, due to environment effects. In this case, the 
adjacency matrix will be strictly upper-triangular. 
As implied by Eq. (14), the cost of perpetual losses is a function of 
the next state, s', whereas the part instantaneous losses depends on 
the current state after the effect of the maintenance action, sa, and the 
next state.  The expected costs in Eq. (14), which is required to solve 
Eq. (8), with the aid of Eq. (9), give the step or interval risk as: 
   
        
, , ,
' , '
'
' '
Pr ' | , ' '
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b s s s a c s d c s
 
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      
  
  (15) 
Using Eq. (15), risk is defined as the expected cumulative discounted 
damage state cost over the life-cycle: 
   
0: 1 1
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To better understand Eq. (16), one can consider a case where the 
system may suffer only instantaneous losses due to failure with cost 
cF.  In this case, Eq. (16) reduces to: 
 
0: 1 0: 0: 0: 0:| , | ,
0
T t t t t t t
T
t
F F o F a o F a o
t
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   (17) 
where PFt is the probability of failure up to time t. The specialized 
definition of risk provided by Eq. (17) follows standard risk and 
reliability assumptions and is well-studied in inspection and 
maintenance planning [10]. The proof that Eq. (16) reduces to Eq. 
(17) under the above stated assumptions is presented in Appendix A. 
This work employs the risk definition of Eq. (16) instead of that of 
Eq. (17), as it facilitates a broader consideration of losses related to 
multiple system states.  
Similarly, the other step costs of Eq. (10) assume the following 
expected cumulative discounted values over the life-cycle: 
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0
1
0
, , { , }
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T t
T t
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t
X o s X t t
t
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t
I o s I t t
t
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C c a s








 
     
 
 
    
 


  (18) 
Hence, the optimal POMDP value with its optimality equation 
described in Eq. (8) is: 
    min
C
V V 
   
b b  
 min
C
M S IC C C
 


 
  
 
       (19) 
Thus, overall, the problem of Eq. (1) consists in jointly minimizing 
the above life-cycle cumulative discounted costs. 
 
2.4. To observe or not? Value of information in POMDPs 
We can define the step-wise Value of Information (VoI) associated 
with a certain policy and a certain inspection action aI as [62]: 
     , , , , , ,,VoI M e M I e Ie e I
a e o a a e o o
step I o o oa V V
      
   
b b   (20) 
Observation oe ϵ Ωe describes the default observation, i.e. an 
observation always available to the decision-maker, oI ϵ ΩI refers to 
the optional observation provided by the selected inspection action, 
and o ϵ Ω =Ωe ×Ω I is the total observation.  
Similarly, we can define the net step-wise VoI under a policy as: 
  ,netVoI VoIstep I step b Ia c
    (21) 
Net step-wise VoI expresses the net gain as a result of additional 
information, also considering the cost to acquire this information (i.e. 
inspection cost). Elaborating on Eq. (8), and considering the fact that 
inspections do not change the state of the system, we have [62]: 
   
  
, ,
,
*
min
max netVoI
M e
e
M M
I I
a e o
ob Ia A
step I
a A
V c V
a





  
 

b b
  (22) 
where cb,I- combines any costs other than the expected inspection 
cost, i.e. maintenance, shutdown, and damage state costs. Eq. (22)
provides an alternative description of the Bellman equation, and 
shows that for any possible maintenance action, the decision-maker 
takes that inspection action which maximizes the net VoI at this step.  
Following the above, the concavity of the POMDP value function 
of Eq. (8), and the properties of the Bellman contraction operator, we 
can show that step-wise VoI, as well as VoI over the life-cycle, are 
always non-negative if the decisions follow the POMDP optimal 
policy [62, 63]. At the extreme case that no inspection means no 
information at all, VoI reaches its highest value. This result can be 
similarly shown. 
3.  Operating under constraints 
We consider the following form of the stochastic optimization 
problem of Eq. (1): 
 
 
0: 0: 0:, , 0: 0: 1 0 0
0
, , ,
0
* ~ , , ~
s.t. , 0, 1,.
arg mi
,
n
.
T T T
T
t
s o a t t t t
t
T
t
h k h k t t h k
t
c a o a s
G g s a k K

  
 




 
 
 
  




b
  (23) 
 
0: 0: 0:, , , , 1 ,
0
, , 0, 1,..,
T T T
T
t
s m s o a s m t t t s m
t
G g s a s m M 

 
    
 
   
where Gh,k and Gs,m are the hard and soft constraints, respectively, 
gh,k and gs,m are their respective auxiliary costs (e.g. cM, cI, cS, cD, or 
else), and αh,k, αs,m are real-valued scalars. The form of constraints in 
Eq. (23) is amenable to a broad class of constraint types that are 
relevant to infrastructure management. For example, hard constraints 
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can model a great variety of fixed resource allocation and control 
action availability problems, such as problems referring to strict 
budget limitations. In turn, soft constraints, of the Eq. (23) form, can 
model a great variety of risk-based constraints. More details about 
these can be found in Section 3.2. The term soft constraints, although 
not standard in stochastic optimization and optimal control literature, 
is used here to distinguish from the term hard constraints, indicating 
that the underlying constraints do not need to be strictly satisfied, but 
are rather imposed in an expected or probabilistic fashion. 
Hard constraints can be straightforwardly taken into account 
through state augmentation. On an interesting remark, in one of his 
notes on dynamic programming under constraints in 1956 [64], R. 
Bellman mentions that this approach may not be favored since “due 
to the limited memory of present-day digital computers, this method 
founders on the reef of dimensionality”. However, this restriction has 
been widely lifted today, whereas DRL has diminished the effects of 
the curse of state dimensionality even further. Thus, state 
augmentation is followed for the hard constraints here. Note that, in 
the special case where functions gs,m are deterministic, soft 
constraints become hard. However, soft constraints are not practical 
to consider through state augmentation since one should track the 
entire distribution of the cumulative discounted value of gs,m. 
Therefore, probabilistic constraints are addressed here through 
Lagrangian relaxation [65]. Based on the above, the optimization 
problem is restated as: 
   
   
0: 0: 0: 0:
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, , 0: 0: 1 0 0 0
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
  





 
 
 

  
 
 

y
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 
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









  
   

y
y
b
  (24) 
where variables ykt track the discounted cumulative value of the 
function related to hard constraints, gh,k, up to time step t-1. Variables 
ykt are upper bounded by ah,k. Lagrange multipliers, λm, constitute the 
dual variables of the max-min dual problem, they are positive scalars, 
and are associated with the soft constraints. 
3.1.  Budget constraints 
Depending on the operational and resource allocation strategy of the 
management agency, available funding for inspection and 
maintenance must comply with certain short-term or long-term goals 
related to a specific budget cycle duration, TB. Namely, in the extreme 
case of a short-term budget cycle duration, budget caps exist for 
every decision step (e.g. annual budget), whereas in the extreme case 
of a long-term budget cycle duration, there is a budget cap pertaining 
to the cumulative inspection and maintenance expenses over the 
entire life-cycle of the system, i.e. TB=T. The cumulative cost of 
inspection and maintenance actions over period TB is given for: 
   ,
th M I
g s a c c     1   (25) 
  / , / 1t B B B Bt T T t T T             (26) 
where x    is the integer part of x. For a given budget cap αh, the 
maintenance and inspection costs at each time step read: 
h h
h h
M My g
I Iy g
c c
c c


 
 


1
1
  (27) 
According to Eqs. (25)-(27), inspection and maintenance costs are 
accounted for only at the current budget cycle, and if the currently 
selected action does not violate the budget cap.  The total cost at each 
time step of Eq. (10) is accordingly rewritten as: 
       1 1, , , ,at M t t I t t S t t D t tc c s a c a s c s a c s s        (28) 
Transition and observation probabilities are also affected by the 
presence of the budget constraints as: 
       Pr | , , Pr | , 1 Pr | ,
h h h h
a a a
y g y g os s y a s s a s s a      1 1   
       
       
Pr ' | , , Pr ' | , 1 Pr ' | ,
Pr ' | ', , Pr ' | ', 1 Pr ' | ',
h h h h
h h h h
a a a
y g y g o
y g y g o
s s y a s s a s s a
o s y a o s a o s a
 
 
   
   
  
  
1 1
1 1
 (29) 
where ao is the trivial decision, where no inspection and no 
maintenance are performed. As indicated by Eqs. (24)-(29), 
incorporation of budget constraints can be accomplished by 
accounting for new state variables y=yt. This way the agent is able to 
reason about control actions based on the available budget, αh - yt, at 
each time step of the decision process. In the case of step-wise budget 
constraints, i.e. TB=1, this state augmentation is not necessary, since 
the agent does not need to track any inspection and maintenance 
expenses made in the past, thus having the entire amount of αh at its 
disposal for every single step.  
As opposed to state variables st, new variables yt are fully 
observable. In this regard, the problem can be also seen as a mixed 
observability Markov decision process, which admits favorable state 
decompositions and can be solved by value iteration algorithms in 
settings with moderate dimensions [18]. In this case, constrained 
value iteration based POMDP solution procedures devised for 
constrained problems can be employed to drive the optimization 
process [44, 45, 46]. However, as for the unconstrained case, such 
formulations can manifest limitations related to efficient scaling in 
systems with large state and action spaces, like the systems that are 
typically encountered in the class of sequential decision-making for 
infrastructure and networks.  
3.2.  Risk-based constraints 
For notational efficiency of the present section we introduce the 
following random variables: 
 1
0
, , , { , , , }
T
t
i i t t t
t
i
i
J c s a s i M I S D
J J

 
 

 



                                (30) 
where 
MJ
 , for example, accumulates total costs, related to 
maintenance  actions  over  the  life-cycle,  and 
0: 0: 0:, ,
[ ]
T T Ts o a M M
J C   
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according to the definitions of Eq. (11). 
We are now interested in incorporating constraints that bound risk 
over the system life-cycle. The risk-related random variable based on  
Eqs. (16) and (30) is 
DJ
 . Thus, the respective constraint function 
obtains the following form, for gs=cD in Eq. (23): 
    
0: 0: 0:
0: 0: 0: 1
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, , 1 1
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T T T t t
s s o a D s
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 
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   
 
   
 
  
       (31) 
It should be noted that, although the budget constraints of focus in 
this work are not soft, budget constraints can also be expressed 
through Gs constraints, satisfied in expectation, depending on the 
modeling needs of the problem, as in Eq. (31). Any other costs as 
introduced in Eq. (10) can be considered in the same logic as well. 
Constraints of the generic Gs form are also the chance or 
probabilistic constraints, which bound the probabilities of certain 
quantities or events [52, 53]. As such, if one wants to bound the 
probability of the optimal policy exceeding a certain life-cycle cost 
threshold Jcr, one may apply the following gs function, for any iJ

similarly to Eq. (31): 
i cr
s t T J J
g   1 1   (32) 
where the second indicator signifies the cumulative cost constraint 
violation, and the first one ensures that this is taken into account once, 
at the end of the planning horizon. Taking the expectation of 
cumulative value of the constraint function of Eq. (32), we have: 
 
0: 0: 0:, ,
0
Pr
T T T i cr
T
s s o a t T sJ J
t
i cr s
G
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 1 1
  (33) 
Considering Eq. (33), if αs =1, we end up with a hard constraint 
requirement, i.e. 
i crJ J
  . It is thus obvious that hard constraints can 
be also seen as a limiting case of soft constraints. 
From a stricter reliability standpoint, many decision problems are 
interested in bounding the probability of failure (i.e. the probability 
reaching a failure state sF  from a  non-failure  state)  over  the  system  
operating life. In this case, we just need to set, 0perDc  , γ=1, and 
1t F
inst
D s sc    in Eq. (31): 
0: 0: 0: 11
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s s o a s s ss s
t
F s
G d
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 


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 
 

  (34) 
PFT is the probability of failure up to the end of the life-cycle t=T. 
Scalar αs in Eq. (33) and (34) is a valid probability designating the (1 
- αs)-percentile of risk and probability of failure, respectively, the 
decision-maker is willing to tolerate.  
Other relevant constraint definitions in stochastic optimization and 
constrained Markov decision processes literature include constraints 
on the value-at-risk and conditional-value-at-risk [66, 53] (with the 
former coinciding with probabilistic constraints), constraints on the 
policy variance [67, 68], as well as constraints whose satisfaction is 
implicitly encouraged through reward-based penalization [69].  
3.3.  Constrained control with deep reinforcement learning 
In recent work by the authors [29, 30], the Deep Centralized Multi-
agent Actor Critic approach has been proposed for management of 
large engineering systems, which treats system control units as 
individual agents making decentralized decisions based on 
shared/centralized system information and actor hidden layer 
parameters. Control units are defined in reference to system parts for 
which separate actions apply at each decision step, and can be either 
individual system components or greater sub-system parts comprised 
of multiple components. As such, one control unit has at least one 
component, and one component may belong to more than one control 
units. The system policy function is written as: 
   ( )
1
ˆ ˆ| , | ,
CUN
i
i
i
a 

a b y b y  (35) 
where a is a vector of actions and bˆ  is a 2D matrix, such that: 
( )
1
( )
1
ˆ
CU
C
N
i
i
N
j
j
a


   
   
a
b b
  (36) 
where a(i) is the action of control unit i, b(j) is the belief of system 
component j, NCU is the number of control units, and NC is the number 
of system components. 
The policy functions of Eq. (35), as well as a centralized system 
Lagrangian value function are parametrized with the aid of deep 
neural networks as: 
   
   
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ| , | , ,
ˆ ˆ, , |
i i i
i i
V
a a
V V

 
 
 b y b y θ
b y b y θ
 (37) 
Parameters ( )iθ , θV are real-valued vectors, and can either vary or be 
shared among control units. In either case, each control unit’s policy  
is conditioned on the global belief and the budget-related states. Note 
that here we have a separate policy network for each agent as denoted 
by superscript i in the policy parameters of Eq. (37), thus a 
completely decentralized actor parametrization is used. To 
distinguish this from the original DCMAC architecture we call this 
Deep Decentralized Multi-agent Actor Critic (DDMAC). As 
discussed  in  Section 1,  both  provide  decentralized  POMDP  policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Constrained Deep Decentralized Multi-agent Actor Critic (DDMAC) 
architecture. 
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solutions. The respective architectures are shown in Fig. 2. In this 
figure, 4 components are depicted, and each component is a control 
unit, thus NCU=NC. 
DDMAC is trained based on off-policy experiences retrieved from  
the replay memory or replay buffer, . These experiences are in the 
form  of  1 , 1ˆ ˆ, , ,[ ] , ,[ ] , ', 'CUN Mi i b s m mc g  b y a b y   tuples that  are generated  
while  the  agent  interacts with  the  environment.  Thus,  the  replay  
memory is a stack of transition tuples.  
The off-policy gradients of the policy function and the value 
function are computed by importance sampling as: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ ˆlog | , , , ,
CU
i
N
i i
t i
i
V w a A

 
  

  
    
  
θ θ b y θ b y a   (38) 
   ˆ ˆ, | , ,VV VtV w V A        θ θ b y θ b y a   (39) 
where wt is the importance sampling weight with sample distribution  
a policy μ retrieved from the experience replay and target distribution 
the  current  policy. A  is  the  advantage  function,  which  is  herein  
approximated by the temporal difference: 
  ,
1
ˆ , , |
M
V
b m s m
m
A c g 

b y a θ  
   ˆ ˆ', ' | , |V VV V   b y θ b y θ  (40) 
The gradient of dual variables λm is easily computed as [50]: 
, ,
0
m
T
t
s m s m
t
V g   

    (41) 
Dual variables are updated through on-policy samples since off-
policy weighted sampling of multiple time steps produces high-
variance estimators that may trigger training instabilities. Algorithm 
1 describes the aforementioned implementation steps. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1. Environment details 
A stochastic, non-stationary, partially observable 10-component 
deteriorating system is considered, operating over a life-cycle period 
of 50 decision steps (years), with a discount factor of γ=0.975. For 
civil engineering systems, discount factors typically range from 0.93 
to 0.98. Higher discount factors make the decision problem more 
challenging, in the sense that they increase the effective horizon of 
important decisions. Links between components create the system 
shown in Fig. 3. It is assumed that link operation depends solely on 
the operating status of the respective components. Overall system 
connectivity is determined by the connectivity of nodes A and B. 
Each component has independent deterioration dynamics. These 
are expressed by 4x4x50 three-dimensional transition matrices, 
corresponding to 4 damage states (intact, minor damage, major 
damage, severe damage), combined with 50 deterioration rates, as 
many as the decision steps of the system life-cycle. Component 
transitions are given in Tables 1,2. Component transition parameters 
for the underlying hidden Markov models are assumed to be known 
or already learned, thus model uncertainty is not considered in this 
example. For learning of hidden Markov models based on structural 
data the interested reader is referred to [70, 71]. Different failure 
probabilities are considered based on each one of the above damage 
states, as shown in Table 3. Thus, the system behavior, as a whole, is 
described by the Bayesian network of Fig. 4. 
Further details on consistently coupling inference of dynamic 
Bayesian networks with POMDPs for deteriorating structures can be 
found in [72, 73]. The final state vector for each component is 
s(i)=(x(i),τ(i),f (i),t),  where x(i) is the damage state; τ(i) is the deterioration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Multi-component deteriorating system. System fails when connectivity 
between nodes A and B is lost. Major costs are incurred when system fails. 
Minor costs are incurred for combinations of failed series subsystems. Types 
I-III refer to the severity of the deterioration model, from less to more severe, 
respectively. 
Algorithm 1 Constrained Deep Decentralized Multi-agent Actor Critic  
 
Initialize replay buffer 
Initialize actor, critic, and dual parameters  ( )
11
, ,
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V m mj
  
  θ θ    
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    Update actor parameters ( )jθ according to gradient:        
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    Update dual variables m , m=1,…,M, based on current policy return,    
    according to gradient:   
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    end for 
end for 
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Table 1 
Component initial damage state transition probabilities for deterioration model 
Types I, II, and III. 
 
Deterioration 
model 
p12 p13 p14 p23 p24 p34 
Type I 0.0129 0.0072 0.0008 0.0102 0.0038 0.0092 
Type II 0.0311 0.0096 0.0014 0.0283 0.0057 0.0281 
Type III 0.0428 0.0229 0.0033 0.0406 0.0095 0.0328 
 
Table 2 
Component final damage state transition probabilities for deterioration model 
Types I, II, and III. 
 
Transition 
probability 
p12 p13 p14 p23 p24 p34 
Type I 0.0618 0.0512 0.0036 0.0905 0.0091 0.0768 
Type II 0.0862 0.0868 0.0051 0.1219 0.0121 0.1091 
Type III 0.1347 0.0669 0.0098 0.1665 0.0244 0.1462 
 
Table 3 
Component failure probabilities for different deterioration types and damage 
states. 
 
Damage 
state 
intact minor major severe 
Type I 0. 0019 0. 0067 0. 0115 0. 0177 
Type II 0. 0028 0. 0076 0. 0163 0. 0219 
Type III 0. 0088 0. 0210 0. 0449 0. 0564 
 
rate; f (i) is a binary failure indicator; and t is the decision time step (t 
is the same for all components). Failure is considered an absorbing 
state. Hence, we assume that when a component fails it remains failed 
at the next step, as long as no restorative action is taken. This allows 
us to augment the component state space, finally obtaining 5x5x50 
transition matrices. 
We consider three types of available maintenance actions; AM 
={no-repair, partial-repair, restoration/replacement}. There are 
also two types of available inspection actions; AI ={no-inspection, 
inspection}. Accordingly, to allow for utmost diversification between 
component policies, each component, which herein defines a separate 
control unit, is assigned 5 available inspection and maintenance 
actions, based on the combinations of the abovementioned sets, i.e. 
a(i) ϵAM×AI \ (restoration/replacement, inspection). The (resto-
ration/replacement, inspection) action is excluded from the set of 
available actions, as it is assumed that whenever a system component 
is replaced, thus returning to an as good as new condition, a decision 
for inspection is strictly suboptimal. No-repair costs are null, whereas 
restoration/replacement costs are the same for all components. 
Partial-repair costs are (7.5,10,15)% of the component replacement 
cost, for component Types (I, III, II), respectively. Inspection costs 
are the same for all components, at 1.5% of the component 
replacement cost. Partial-repairs send components one damage state 
back without changing the deterioration rate, restorations/ 
replacements send components to the initial damage state and 
deterioration rate, whereas no-repairs have no effect on the damage 
state and deterioration rate. Partial-repairs have no effect on failed 
components and are considered to have been completed before the 
next environment transition.  When restorations/replacements are 
chosen, these are completed at the end of the next time step, negating 
the deterioration transition during that step. Thus, in this case, the 
next state is the intact one with certainty. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Dynamic Bayesian network of multi-component deteriorating system 
in time. 
 
If an inspection action is taken, observation probabilities are given 
by the following observation matrices: 
  ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )Pr | , { }
0.84 0.13 0.02 0.01
0.11 0.77 0.09 0.03
0.02 0.16 0.70 0.12
0.01 0.02 0.13 0.84
1
i
i
i i i
M o
s S
o s a A inspection


   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (42) 
Observation matrices depend on state discretization and presumed 
measurement noise or estimated model errors [15]. Failure is 
considered to be a self-announcing event, hence, component (5,5) of 
the observation matrix of Eq. (42) is 1. Accordingly, if no inspection 
is taken the observation matrix reads: 
  ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )Pr | , { }
1 1 1 1
1
i
i
i i i
M o
s S
T
o s a A no inspection


    
 
 
  
 
  (43) 
System failure, i.e. loss of connectivity between nodes A and B, is 
described by random variable fs. Random variable fs assumes 4 values 
associated with events E0: all links available, E1: 25% of links failed, 
E2: 50% of links failed without system failure, and Fs: system failure. 
A link is failed if at least one component is failed. We can thus 
consider the series subsystems, controlling the link failures, 
l1={1,2,3}, l2={4,5}, l3={6,7} and l4={8,9,10}. Their failure events 
are accordingly described by events Fl,1, Fl,2, Fl,3, and Fl,4. Based on 
the above, it can be derived that the system failure probability is: 
 
           
4
,1 ,3 ,2 ,4 ,
1
Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Prs l l l l l i
i
F F F F F F

     (44) 
c1 c2 cT 
τ0 τ1 τ2 
x0 x1 x2 
o0 o1 o2 
a0 a1 a2 
f0 f1 f2 
c0 
τT 
xT 
oT 
aT-1 
fT 
fS,0 fS,1 fS,2 fS,T 
i=1,…,Nc 
(i) (i) (i) (i) 
(i) (i) (i) (i) 
(i) (i) (i) (i) 
(i) (i) (i) 
(i) (i) (i) (i) 
(i) 
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The corresponding non-failure events of interest, E0, E1, E2, are 
defined as: 
4
0 ,
1
4 4
1 , ,
1
4
2 , ,
, 1,
:
:
:
l i
i
l i l j
i j i
l i l j s
i j i j
E F
E F F
E F F F



 

 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  (45) 
Accordingly, the probabilities of events E1, E2 are computed as: 
    
      
       
4
0 ,
1
44
1 , ,
1 1,
2 0 1
Pr 1 Pr
Pr 1 Pr Pr
Pr 1 Pr Pr Pr
l i
i
l j l i
i j j i
s
E F
E F F
E E E F

  
 
 
   

    (46) 
Perpetual and instantaneous losses due to failure are equivalent to 2.5  
and 50 times the system rebuild cost, respectively,  i.e. 2.5
s
per
F rebc c   
and 50
s
inst
F rebc c  ,  respectively.   Similarly,  we  consider  perpetual  
and instantaneous losses incurred when 25% and 50% of system links 
are not available (i.e. at least one of their respective components is at 
the failure state). These losses  are  incurred  if  events  E1, E2  occur,   
respectively,  and  are quantified in cost units as 
1
0.05perE rebc c  ,
2
0.25perE rebc c  , 1 1
inst
E rebc c  , 2 5
inst
E rebc c  .  In  case  of  transporta- 
tion networks, for example, such perpetual losses may refer to time 
delays and/or additional user costs due to detours, whereas such 
instantaneous losses may pertain to capital loss due to asset failures 
related to those links. 
Based on the above losses, the fact that system events are fully 
observable, and following the risk definition of Eq. (16), the interval 
risk reads:  
     , 1 , 1
2 1
, , 1 ,
{ , , }
Pr 1 Pr
s t s t
s
s
per inst
b D s t f s t f
f
F E E
c f c f c
 

     (47) 
Apart from the above losses, additional costs are included in the 
analysis, pertaining to scheduled system shutdowns. Those come as 
a result of different action combinations on different system 
components. That is, considering that non-trivial maintenance 
actions require some degree of component non-operability for 
completion during a time step, events Ea0, Ea1, Ea2, Fas can occur, in 
analogy to events E0, E1, E2, Fs. Those losses are only incurred if the 
system would be otherwise in an operating condition, i.e. not failed. 
Events and their probabilities are similarly defined as in Eqs. (45)-
(47), whereas respective costs are the same as the perpetual losses 
due to events E0, E1, E2, Fs.  
4.2. Experimental setup 
For the purposes of this numerical investigation two sets of analyses 
a conducted. The first set considers a budget cycle period of TB = 5. 
Each budget period shares the same budget cap, and 9 different levels 
of budget constraints are considered, which are given as functions of 
the system rebuild cost, {5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, 25, 30}% creb. 
For the second set of analyses, 9 different levels of life-cycle risk 
constraints are considered, i.e. {1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 2.75, 
3.25} creb. In addition to the above analyses, the unconstrained policy 
is also learned. 
For training, the Keras deep learning python libraries are used with 
Tensorflow backend. For all analyses, the actor networks consist of 
two fully connected hidden layers with 50 Rectified Linear Unit 
activation functions each, for all 10 components. No parameters are 
shared among component actors, and each control unit has a 5-
dimensional softmax output corresponding to the cardinality of 
AM×AI \ (restoration/replacement, inspection). The critic network 
also consists of two fully connected hidden layers with 150 ReLU 
activations each. The critic has a one-dimensional linear output, 
which approximates the POMDP Lagrangian value function of the 
entire system.   
The Adam optimizer [74] is utilized for stochastic gradient descent 
on the networks parameter space, with learning rates being gradually 
adjusted from 1E-3 and 1E-4, to 1E-4 and 1E-5 for the critic and 
actor, respectively. The learning rate of Lagrange multipliers is set to 
1E-5. The size of the experience replay is set equal to 300,000 and an 
exploration noise of linearly annealed from 100% to 1% is added at 
the first 2500 episodes of the training process.  
 
4.3. DRL solutions and baseline policies 
To verify the quality of DDMAC solutions, we construct and 
optimize various baseline policies, incorporating well-established 
condition- risk-, and time-based inspection and maintenance 
assumptions, which are also combined with periodic action 
considerations, as well as component prioritization approaches. 
These baselines are: 
 Fail Replacement (FR) policy. No inspections are taken.  If a 
component fails it is immediately replaced. No variable is 
optimized.  
 Age-Periodic Maintenance (APM) policy. No inspections are 
taken, whereas maintenance actions are taken based on the age of 
components.  Two maintenance ages are optimized; periodic age 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of DDMAC life-cycle policies with different baseline 
policies. Total life-cycle cost and life-cycle costs due to inspection, 
maintenance, shutdown, and risk. The best optimized baseline is 42% worse 
than the DDMAC policy. 
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for component partial-repair and periodic age for component 
restoration/replacement.  
 Age-Periodic Inspections and Condition-Based Maintenance 
(API-CBM) policy. Age-based inspections are taken for all 
components, based on each component’s age. At inspection 
times, maintenance actions are taken based on the observed 
damage state of each component. Five variables are optimized; 
age interval for component inspection, and type of maintenance 
for each one of the 4 observed damage states. 
 Time-Periodic Inspections and Condition-Based Maintenance 
(TPI-CBM) policy. Time-based inspections are taken for all 
components at fixed intervals of the planning horizon. At 
inspection times, maintenance actions are taken based on the 
observed damage state of each component. Five variables are 
optimized; time interval for block component inspection, and 
type of maintenance for each one of the 4 observed damage states. 
 Risk-Based Inspections and Condition-Based Maintenance (RBI-
CBM) policy. Inspections are taken for all components each time 
the system exceeds a predefined failure probability threshold. At 
inspection times, maintenance actions are taken based on the 
observed damage state of each component. Five variables are 
optimized; failure probability threshold, and type of maintenance 
for each one of the 4 observed damage states. 
The last two baseline policies are also optimized with Component 
Prioritization (CP), which produces policies RBI-CBM-CP and TPI-
CBM-CP. Components are prioritized based on their probability of 
failure. In this case, one extra decision variable regarding the number 
of components (1 to 10) to inspect and maintain is added. This policy 
adapts a heuristic presented in [10]. In all baselines, if a component 
fails, it is immediately replaced. 
In Fig. 5, a comparison of the learned DDMAC policy with the 
various baselines is presented, for the unconstrained environment 
(total costs and decomposed costs in linear and log scales, 
respectively). The best optimal baseline is the policy combining risk-
based inspections, condition-based maintenance and component 
prioritization. It can be observed that the life-cycle cost attained by 
the best baseline is about 42% worse than the DDMAC solution. The 
optimal age-periodic maintenance and fail-replacement policies, do 
not include the possibility of inspections and achieve the worst life-  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of DDMAC life-cycle policies for different 5-year 
constraints from 5% creb to infinity. Total life-cycle cost and life-cycle costs 
due to inspection, maintenance, shutdown, and risk. 
cycle costs. It is overall observed that baselines including inspections 
achieve consistently better results. Adding to this remark, it is 
interesting to note that the DDMAC policy spends more for 
inspections, i.e. performs a higher number of inspections, compared 
to the 3 best optimal baselines. As discussed, these inspections are in 
principle non-periodic and, as shown in Section 2.4, are driven by the 
innate notion of VoI in POMDPs. This allows the agents to make 
more informed decisions regarding proper maintenance actions that 
overall minimize the total cumulative costs of Eq. (19) more 
efficiently. Risk is significantly reduced with the DDMAC policy, as 
also indicated in Fig. 5, whereas scheduled system shutdown costs 
are more intelligently avoided compared to other baselines, due to the 
flexibility in intervention timings and action combinations. 
 
4.4. Constrained system solutions 
Constrained DDMAC results for life-cycle inspection costs, 
maintenance costs, shutdown costs and risk for different 5-year 
constraint levels are shown in Fig. 6 (all costs in log scale). As 
expected, higher budget limits result in lower total life-cycle costs. 
Budget limits higher than 25% of the system rebuild cost, creb, 
practically converge to the unconstrained solution. A noticeable 
feature of the learned near-optimal policies is that as budget becomes 
tighter, the agents tend to reduce their inspection expenses, to save 
resources in case of a need for major interventions (e.g. 
restoration/replacement actions). This means that they deliberately 
choose to forfeit better system information, in order to be more 
effective against disruption. It is characteristic that inspections are 
overall reduced in the budget cases below 15% creb, compared to the 
cases above that budget threshold, since the component replacement 
cost is 10% creb. That is, below 10% creb budget constraints, 
restorations/replacements are infeasible. In Fig. 7, the respective 
results for risk constraints are shown (all costs in log scale). It can be 
observed that as the decision-making task becomes more risk averse 
the total life-cycle cost becomes higher, since more frequent 
inspection and maintenance actions need to be taken. Constrained 
solutions practically converge to the unconstrained one after the risk 
tolerance threshold of 2.75creb. It is interesting to note here that for 
lower risk constraints, i.e. for scenarios where the agents need to keep 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of DDMAC life-cycle policies for different life-cycle risk 
constraints from 1 creb to infinity. Total life-cycle cost and life-cycle costs due 
to inspection, maintenance, shutdown, and risk. 
C. P. Andriotis, K. G. Papakonstantinou / Deep reinforcement learning driven inspection and maintenance planning under incomplete information and constraints 
12 
 
Fig. 8. Components maintenance and inspection frequency per step and 
respective mean costs for 5-year budget constraints of 15% and 20% creb. 
 
total risk lower over the operating life, although the maintenance cost 
increases, the inspection cost is not following the same trend, hence, 
the inspection per maintenance cost ratio of the optimal policy 
consistently decreases. This is attributed to the fact that more frequent 
maintenance is unavoidable in a case where risks have to be kept low, 
something that, by itself, leads on average, to longer sojourn in states 
of lower damage. As such, increased frequency of inspections, which 
would solely serve better state determination, is not favored by the 
agents, and thus life-cycle inspection costs do not present important 
changes for different risk-based constraints. Accordingly, due to the 
high demand for maintenance actions, scheduled shutdown costs also 
increase in low-risk cases.  
In Fig. 8, action frequencies and respective cost metrics of 
inspection and maintenance are depicted for two budget constraints 
corresponding to a low and a high budget scenario, i.e.  to 15% and 
20% creb 5-year budget constraints, respectively. Contour plots depict 
the frequency of maintenance and inspection actions per time unit. 
Adjacent graphs on the right show the mean step cost per component 
related to the respective action type, whereas the bottom graphs show 
the action cost per step, collectively for the all system components. 
The same features are depicted for risk constraints of 2.75 and 3.25 
creb in Fig. 9. Examining Figs. 6 and 8 together, we can observe that 
lowering the budget from 20% to 15% creb has significant 
consequences for risk, which increases disproportionally with the 
achieved reduction in the expected total life-cycle maintenance cost. 
What changes significantly for maintenance cost, as shown in Fig. 8, 
is its distribution per time unit and component, rather than its total 
life-cycle value. This is indicative of the general observation that 
stricter budgets increase risk, without necessarily yielding clear 
economic budget-related benefits, if any, in the long run. Another 
interesting feature is that, in the presence of stricter budgets, the 
imbalance in the allocation of maintenance resources among 
components increases. Inspections and their respective expenditures 
are considerably restricted, as also mentioned previously. As also 
shown in Fig. 8, for the 15% creb case, inspections are rather reserved  
Fig. 9. Components maintenance and inspection frequency per step and 
respective mean costs for risk constraints of 2.75 and 3.25 creb. 
 
mainly for component 4, as this is the most vulnerable component of 
path 6,7,4,5, which is the path securing system survival with the least 
number of components. 
For the cases of risk-based constraints, examining Figs. 7 and 9 
together, we can observe that relevant costs are distributed more 
evenly in time over the planning horizon. Over the system life-cycle, 
we observe that lowering the risk tolerance considerably encumbers 
maintenance costs per step and in total. Similarly to the budget-
constrained cases, for the 2.75 creb versus 3.25 creb risk constraint 
case, inspections are prominently clustered to fewer components. 
Accordingly, it is observed that the agents reserve their inspection 
actions exclusively for components 3-5,7,8,10. This intrinsically 
prioritized selection of components to be frequently inspected allows 
the agents to track the state of at least half of the components from 
each link, and thereby to better synchronize maintenance actions in 
order to minimize system shutdowns and costs. It was observed that 
although mathematically feasible from an optimization perspective, 
policies below 2.0 creb start becoming practically unrealistic due to 
the very frequent restorations/replacements that need to be taken in 
order for the risk constraints to be satisfied. 
To look closer into how policies change for different constraints, 
4 detailed policy realizations are shown in Figs. 10 and 11, for the 
constrained environments shown in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively. In 
Fig. 10(a), displaying the realization of component failure 
probabilities and respective inspection and maintenance actions, for 
two cases of 5-year budget constraints, it can be readily observed that, 
in the low budget scenario, available budgetary resources are 
primarily allotted to the maintenance needs of components 3,4,8, and 
9. This is explained by the fact that these are Type III components, 
thus being described by the most aggressive deterioration. In this 
realization example, only component 4 is inspected, since, as also 
explained earlier, with a budget limit close to the component 
replacement cost, the agents choose to inspect more rarely in order to 
save resources if major interventions are needed. In the high budget 
scenario, inspections play a  more prominent role, since the imposed  
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Fig. 10. A life-cycle realization of the DDMAC policy for 15% creb and 20% creb 5-year budget constraints. (a) Component failure probabilities and actions; (b) 
System failure with selected interventions; (c) Costs of inspection and maintenance actions, scheduled shutdowns, and risks. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. A life-cycle realization of the learned DDMAC policy for 2.75 creb and 3.25 creb life-cycle risk constraints. (a) Component failure probabilities and 
actions; (b) System failure probability with selected interventions; (c) Costs of inspection and maintenance actions, scheduled shutdowns, and risks. 
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Fig. 12. System mean failure probabilities based on DDMAC life-cycle 
policies for different (a) 5-year budget constraints and (b) life-cycle risk 
constraints.  
budget restrictions have become looser, and the agents have the 
budgetary capacity to afford expenditure for acquiring information. 
Although Type III components continue to receive the majority of 
maintenance actions, intervention resources are now allotted more 
frequently to all components. Some of the most prominent 
intervention effects changing significantly the overall system failure 
probability, are indicated in Fig. 10(b). The various costs are also 
tracked in Fig. 10(c). For the 20% creb case, a notable feature can be 
observed for components 6 and 7, controlling the operability of the 
third link. Component 7 fails at t=38 and available resources do not 
allow for immediate replacement, which is postponed to t=40, when 
the next budget cycle begins. In the meanwhile, the agent of 
component 6 takes advantage of the link shutdown and applies 
repeated opportunistic partial repairs which do not yield additional 
shutdown costs. Overall, it can be interestingly observed in Figs. 8 
and 10, that the agents, despite their decentralized policies, form and 
increase collaboration as the budget becomes lower, directing their 
focus to components that are more vulnerable to deterioration, or 
more strategically placed in terms of system connectivity. 
Similar features can be seen for the low- and high-risk constraints 
cases of Fig. 11. In the 3.25 creb case, effectively coinciding with the 
unconstrained policy, a complex and diverse policy is overall 
illustrated. It is worth noting that, in the absence of any budget 
constraints, inspections are now taken frequently for all components, 
whereas restoration/replacement actions start to also have more 
prominent preventive characteristics, i.e. they are not only reserved 
for failure events. This is even more apparent in the low-risk scenario, 
in which case, restorations need to be performed in a more recurrent 
fashion to ensure low probability of failure. In turn, this also causes 
more system closures and, thus, increases shutdown costs. To balance 
this side effect of frequent restorative actions, the agents are 
interestingly shown to deploy a block-restoration/replacement logic 
in their policies. That is, as shown in the 2.75 creb scenario of Fig. 
11(a), component agents of the same links synchronize their 
restoration actions (e.g. components 2,3 at t=37; components 8-10 at 
t=20; components 4,5 at t=26), whereas they also start to extensively 
leverage opportunistic interventions in links where failure events 
occur (e.g. components 1-3 at t=12; components 4,5 at t=39). The 
system failure probability and the various costs along with various 
actions that affect them are shown in Figs. 11(b),(c), respectively. 
The mean failure interval probability of the system over time is 
shown in Fig. 12, for various 5-year budget and various life-cycle risk 
constraints. It is observed that, on average, system failure probability 
reaches its peak before the onset of new budget cycles. For the 
unconstrained case, mean failure probability is allowed to increase 
over time, without abrupt escalations, since no budget limitation is 
imposed. The 7.5% creb constrained case reflects an extreme life-
cycle optimization setting where no replacement actions are feasible. 
Thus, in this case no major corrective steps are detected in the 
evolution of the mean failure probability. In the case of risk 
constraints, the more stringent the risk constraint is, the higher is the 
reliability of the system at each time step, as anticipated. 
5.  Conclusions 
In this work a stochastic optimal control framework for inspection 
and maintenance planning of deteriorating systems operating under 
incomplete information and constraints is developed. Decision-
making is cast in a multi-agent decentralized framework of DRL and 
POMDPs, where each system component, or control unit consisting 
of multiple components, acts as an independent agent given the 
dynamically updated global system state probabilistic information. 
While satisfying a shared overarching objective, each agent can make 
its own inspections and maintenance choices. Operational resource-
based restrictions and policy risk considerations are taken into 
account by means of relevant stochastic soft and/or hard constraints. 
The latter are incorporated in the solution scheme through state 
augmentation, thus being rendered as environment properties, 
whereas the former are appended in the life-cycle objective function 
as dual variables, to form the Lagrangian function to be optimized. 
Modeling of various constraint choices is discussed, whereas a 
thorough numerical investigation is provided for budget and risk 
constraints, which are of particular significance in infrastructure 
management applications. Along these lines, a broad risk definition 
is also presented and utilized in the constrained optimization 
procedure, accommodating both the instantaneous and perpetual 
nature of damage-related losses. This risk definition is further shown 
to be reducible to classic reliability-based definitions. Solutions to 
the optimization problem are driven by the introduced DDMAC 
algorithm. DDMAC uses both policy and value function 
parametrizations, experience replay, off-policy network parameter 
updating, and operates on the belief space of the underlying POMDP.  
Operation under constraints is shown to considerably affect how 
the agents adapt their policies. The conducted parametric analysis 
shows that: 
 The need for inspections and, therefore, the value of information, 
fades in low-budget environments, where the agents tend to 
diminish expenses otherwise allotted to system updating needs, in 
order to secure advanced intervention capabilities through 
availability of maintenance resources.  
 Stricter budget constraints reduce inspection and maintenance 
costs for the respective budget cycle, however, without 
comparably reducing these costs in the long run, i.e., cumulatively, 
over the system life-cycle.  
 In risk-averse environments, inspection costs do not follow the 
notable increase in maintenance costs, which are necessary in 
order to maintain low-risk levels over the system operating life.  
(a) 
(b) 
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 In such cases, agents are shown to increasingly leverage the 
structural properties of the system or incidental sub-system failure 
configurations, to develop opportunistic repair strategies, so that 
system operability is minimally disrupted.  
 Budget limitations and risk intolerance, disproportionally increase 
the risk and maintenance costs, respectively, compared to the 
reductions they achieve in the constrained quantities. 
 For both types of constraints, multi-agent cooperation emerges 
more prevalent as restrictions become stricter, since resource 
scarcity and risk intolerance force the agents to more carefully 
reallocate resources and redefine management priorities, based on 
the specific deterioration dynamics and structural importance of 
different system parts. This rescheduling arises naturally and 
intrinsically through the training process, without any explicit 
user-based enforcement or penalty-driven motivation. 
Overall, the derived DRL policies showcase remarkable flexibility 
and multi-agent cooperation in various constrained and un-
constrained environments, whereas the obtained decentralized 
solutions are found to significantly outperform conventional and 
state-of-the-art inspection and maintenance planning formulations.  
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Appendix A: On the definition of risk 
Proposition A.1. If only failure incurs damage cost, this cost is cF, 
and it is instantaneous, then: 
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P are the probabilities of failure up to time 
t+1 and t, respectively, given a history of actions and observations 
a0:t, o0:t. 
Proof. By definition, the transition probability from sa to s' can be 
written as: 
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where dij and δij are the adjacency and Kronecker indicators, as 
defined in Eqs. (14) and (7), respectively, for all i,j belonging to S. 
Thus, using Eq. (A.1), the expected cost of the instantaneous costs of 
Eq. (14) reads: 
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Combining both instantaneous and perpetual damage costs, and 
elaborating further on Eq. (15) we finally obtain: 
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Using Eq. (A.3), risk is defined as the cumulative damage state cost 
over the life-cycle in expectation: 
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Eq. (A.4) is equivalent to Eq. (15). We now consider that only failure 
incurs damage related cost, this cost is cF, and it is instantaneous. We  
denote failure state(s) as sF. The respective cost is written as
1t F
inst
D s s Fc c  . In this case, Eq. (A.4) reduces to: 
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Probability ba(.), is the updated probability, as defined by Eqs. (4) and 
(6), hence, ba(.) = Pr( . |a0:t,o0:t). As such, Eq. (A.5) is equivalently 
written as: 
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From (A.6) follows immediately that
F
   .       
Under the assumptions of the above proposition, one can model the 
POMDP problem with damage cost: 
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Marginalizing with respect  to  s'  and  assuming  that  pair  (s,a)  leads  
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deterministically to sa, a simpler expression can also be used for the 
cost function: 
 , Pr( | , ) a
F
a
D F F Fs s
c s a s s a c c                                        (A.8) 
Note that Eq. (A.8) is a closed form expression, if transitions to 
failure state from all other states, Pr(sF | sa,a), are known, i.e. 
according to standard offline Markov decision processes semantics.          
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